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This study responds to the need for measures to mitigate the effects of national actions 
to slow the spread of COVID-19. National responses are dynamic processes and thus 
an elusive, albeit important, object of study. The governments of most CIS countries 
acted promptly and decisively in countering the pandemic. The comprehensive 
measures have had a serious impact on citizens’ mobility and employment situation. 
Among the affected are millions of migrants working in the CIS. This article offers a 
comparative analysis, followed by synthesis, of the negative effects of the COVID-19 
pandemic as seen through the prism of employment and the situation of migrant 
workers in the CIS. Another focus is the restriction and support measures and how 
they have affected migrants. A range of qualitative and quantitative data was collated 
on the situation of migrant workers during COVID-19 restriction in the Russian 
Federation and across the CIS. The findings suggest that the lack of international 
coordination in tackling COVID-19 has complicated the situation of migrant workers, 
who suffer from the closure of borders and the absence of adequate social support. 
The article explores problems faced by migrant workers in the current crisis and 
proposes measures to alleviate them.
Keywords:  
COVID-19, pandemic, CIS, migration flows, migrant workers, migrant crisis, 
remittances.
Introduction
The beginning of 2020 witnessed an outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. In 
the first months, the virus was confined to China, but later it spread to all conti-
nents, and the CIS countries were no exception.
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The tough restrictions aimed to control the spread of COVID-19 provoked a 
terrible crisis in the world economy, which had a profound effect on all aspects of 
everyday life, regardless of one’s social standing and status. The main restrictions 
limited migration mobility since the state viewed minimising personal contacts as 
essential to control the spread of the virus. To the same end, borders were closed 
and all transport connections suspended [1]. These decisions have led to ma-
jor changes in global migration processes since many states closed their borders 
without giving migrants and their own nationals a chance to leave the country or 
return home. The paralysis of many industries that traditionally employ migrants 
has resulted in mass layoffs. The workers have no money either to go home or to 
stay in the host country.
Approaches to managing migrant flows vary from state to state depending on 
how fast COVID-19 reached the country as well as on what contribution migra-
tion makes to the economy [1]. Since migrants have an important role in the econ-
omies of the source and host countries, both are responsible for managing migra-
tion flows. Migrants drive forward the economy of the host country, whereas the 
economy of the source country depends on migrant remittances to a considerable 
degree. When living conditions deteriorate, the health of citizens is threatened, 
and there is a pressing need for return migration, the country must provide them 
with such an opportunity.
This article analyses the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on the situation of 
migrants in the CIS countries. It aims to identify negatives effects the restrictions 
have had on migrants, as well as to propose a way to handle the crisis, using ex-
isting support measures.
The CIS migration flows constitute two out of five major global migration 
corridors (Russia — Kazakhstan and Russia — Ukraine1) with a total migration 
turnover of 6m people.2 The CIS pandemic-induced migration crisis is influenc-
ing both regional and global trends. It is affecting the world economy as well. The 
CIS may set a good example to third states faced with a COVID-19 migration 
crisis in solving the problems relating to migrant movements and status.
Since the pandemic is far from over, and the virus comes in waves, the restric-
tions are likely to be tightened and eased more than. This study offers guidelines 
for minimising the damage that the restrictions have caused to migrants. Such 
advice may be welcome in countries where migration has an important role in the 
economy, and any migration crisis has economic fallout [2].
1 Before the Ukrainian crisis erupted.
2 Annual Report 2016, 2016, The World Bank. URL: http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/
en/596391540568499043/worldbankannualreport2016.pdf (accessed 11.07.2020).
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Information sources and theoretical approaches to research
The COVID-19 pandemic is a global phenomenon posing new socio-economic 
and demographic challenges. Few theoretical and methodological works may aid 
in providing a rationale for the effects of the pandemic, particularly those on mo-
bility and the situation of labour migrants. Nor there is a single methodology for 
collecting statistical data on migrants facing difficulties in host, transit, and source 
countries. In most cases, data from information agencies, the media, and official 
spokespersons are used.
The article draws on investigations conducted by researchers and experts from 
international organisations and the CIS research institutes and universities in 2020. 
The contribution is based on scientific reports, research working papers, 2020 spe-
cial issues of academic journals, and international organisations’ reviews of mi-
grant and labour market situation in the COVID-19 pandemic. The international 
organisations that have looked into the impact of the pandemic on mobility and the 
situation of migrants in the CIS are the United National Development Programme, 
the International Organisation for Migration (IOM),3 the International Centre for 
Migration Policy Development [3], the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
[6],4 the United Nations Population Fund (UNPF), the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) [7],5 the World Bank [8],6 the Moscow 
Bureau for Human Rights, the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC), and the 
Eurasian Development Bank (EDB). Russian research institutes and universities 
have also conducted empirical studies of the situation of labour and education mi-
grants in the CIS. Among these are the Institute for Demographic Research of the 
Federal Centre of Theoretical and Applied Sociology of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences (FCTASRAS) [1; 4—8], the Russian Presidential Academy of National 
Economy and Public Administration [9], the Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy 
[10—12], and the Higher School of Economics and the Institute of Sociology of 
3 Combatting xenophobia is key to effective COVID-19 recovery. 2020, Press release, IOM, 
22 May 2020. URL: www.iom.int/news/combatting-xenophobia-key-effective-covid-19-
recovery (accessed 11.07.2020); COVID-19 Analytical Snapshot #40: Returning Migrants, 
2020, IOM, 20 May 2020. URL: www.iom. int/sites/default/files/documents/covid-19_
analytical_snapshot_40_-_returning_migrants.pdf (accessed 11.07.2020).
4 Protecting migrant workers during the COVID-19 Pandemic: Recommendations for Policy-
makers and Constituents, 2020, ILO Policy Brief, Geneva, April 2020. URL: https://www.
ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_protect/—-protrav/—-migrant/documents/publication/
wcms_743268.pdf (accessed 13.07.2020).
5 Supporting livelihoods during the COVID-19 crisis: Closing the gaps in safety nets, 
2020, OECD, 20 May 2020. URL: https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/view/?ref=132_132985-
hrr3dbjimj&title=Supporting-livelihoods-during-the-COVID-19_crisis%20oe.cd/il/30z. 
(accessed 15.07.2020).
6 Potential responses to the COVID-19 outbreak in support of migrant workers. Living Paper 




the FCTASRAS [12]. A series of random sample surveys of labour migrants was 
carried out in spring 2020. Respondents were recruited via social media (Facebook 
and Vkontakte) and migrant organisations [13].7
Тhe theoretical aspect of the study. At the beginning of the 21st century, glo-
balisation, development of online communications, and progress of transport net-
works links caused a sharp increase in the number of both international migrants 
[14; 15] and transboundary transit migration flows [16]. Before the COVID-19 
pandemic, migration was responsible for the rapid movement of large numbers 
of people. A vivid illustration is the migrant crisis of 2015 when Europe accepted 
about 1.1 m asylum seekers and refugees. In the pre-pandemic period, the de-
velopment of virtual communication networks and transport modernisation were 
making migration control by nation-states ever less effective [44]. Migration 
flows were increasingly perceived by national governments as threats to security 
[17; 18]; securitisation of migration was being replaced by a closed-door policy 
[19]. EU initiatives to regain control over undocumented transit migration flows 
created a rift between member states and highlighted their differences in the vi-
sion of a migration policy and migration control [20].
Western European researchers have concluded investigations on changes in 
visa regimes over the past 50 years, and come to the conclusion that restrictions 
are ineffective — they have side effects, such as migration taking illegal forms, 
changing routes, and delays but do not make people abandon their plans [21; 22]. 
As border control becomes more stringent, migrants start to look for new ways 
to reach their country of destination. Thus, the geography of migration flows is 
constantly changing [15; 23].
Traditionally considered in the context of globalisation and growing migra-
tion flows, migrations processes were viewed before the pandemic as a natural 
consequence of increasing mobility, technological innovation, and other related 
factors [24]. Although regional processes taking place within the global migra-
tion regime were believed to be multi-directional phenomena, they were seen 
as merely supporting the general trend [25]. Before the 2015 migrant crisis, mi-
gration-related health risks were a relatively marginal subject of research. These 
risks were associated with refugee camps and ecological conflicts and people 
escaping them [15]. These problems were localised to areas providing shelter for 
large numbers of displaced persons [26].
When analysing the impact of COVID-19 on migration mobility in the CIS, 
it is important to keep in mind the multiple factors and complexity of intercon-
nections that have emerged since the borders of almost all states were closed and 
almost all kinds of passenger traffic were frozen across the globe.
A unique feature of the worldwide mobility crisis caused by the pandemic is 
that the threat to survival and the need for prompt decisions have brought na-
7 Ryazantsev, S. V. 2020, The Situation of Migrant Workers in Russia During the COVID-19 
Pandemic (Results of a Sociological Study), International Conference The Impact of the 
COVID-19 Pandemic on Migration Mobility, Institute of Socio-Political Research of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences and MGIMO University, 27 April 2020, Moscow. URL: http://
испи.рф/the-impact-of-the-covid-19-pandemic-on-migration-mobility/ (accessed 14.07.2020).
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tion-states to the forefront of the fight, which consists partly of border closure and 
various forms of quarantine restrictions. At first, supranational associations, such 
as the EU, the UN, the OECD were not ready either to rise to the new challenges 
to personal and public security or to handle insecurity around economics, food, 
health, and the environment [27]. But, as the crisis progressed, these organisations 
started to work towards solidarity and international response to the pandemic [12].
Of course, economic crises affecting migration happened before COVID-19. 
The crisis of the early 1970s forced numerous migrants from Turkey and South-
ern Europe to settle in Western Europe. The financial crisis of 2008 was accompa-
nied by mass return migration. In Russia and Ukraine, the refugee crisis of 2015 
manifested itself differently than in the EU. Still, the problem of asylum-seekers 
was not a major focus of research in the CIS in the 2010s. Yet, in the west, asy-
lum-seekers and the routs they use to reach the EU have long been the centre of 
scholarly attention [28; 29],8 the more so when applications for protection are not 
considered any more due to the pandemic. Asylum-seekers keep arriving at the 
south of the EU; refugee quotas are causing growing tensions between the mem-
ber states. The EU refugee discourse is an important part of western European 
literature [30], alongside that on undocumented migrants [28].
The political and academic discussion of possibilities to bring migrants back 
to their countries, which was sparked off by the refugee crisis, continue among 
the western scholars in the context of quarantine restrictions and the prevention 
of undocumented migration in different countries [31]. The state as an institute 
is the key player when it comes to the rule for entering and exiting the country 
or staying in it and the state in its legislation put criterions to decides who is an 
immigrant, who is a refugee, and who is an undocumented migrant [19]. Un-
der lockdown, migrants can easily find themselves in an undocumented situation 
should entry and exit rules change and corresponding penalties be introduced.
A positive development is that large European host countries have chosen 
the way of so-called migration amnesty with different forms of liberalisation of 
residence permit. Kazakhstan and Russia have also liberalised migrant access to 
the labour market until the end of 2020. Remarkably, the idea of labour migrant 
amnesty has been entertained in Russia, which has a large undocumented migrant 
labour market, for quite some time. Nevertheless, a lack of trust in human rights 
bodies prevented it from ever becoming part of the migration policy. Only when 
the pandemic threatened national security, when desperate unemployed migrants, 
probably counted in millions, were to find themselves in a hopeless situation, the 
Russian government adopted unprecedented measures to liberalise the national 
migration law.
8 COVID-19 Analytical Snapshot #40: Returning Migrants, 2020, International Organization 
for Migration, Geneva, 20 May. URL: www.iom.int/sites/default/files/documents/covid-19_
analytical_snapshot_40_-_returning_migrants.pdf (accessed 13.07.2020); Protecting 
migrant workers during the COVID-19 Pandemic: Recommendations for policymakers 




Russian researchers have stressed that previous migration crises faced by their 
countryand the current one have entirely different causes. In 2008—2009 and 
2015, the absolute number of labour migrants did not decline, but the ratio be-
tween those employed legally and illegally changed [32]. The reason for it was 
twofold: employees trying to economise by using undocumented labour [33] and 
the unsuccessful government policy on labour migration [11]. During previous 
crises, the governments of developed countries and Russia adopted discriminatory 
practices against migrants to protect the national labour market to the benefit of 
their citizens [34]. It has been stressed that the traditional populist line of conduct 
pursued by governments in crises — getting rid of migrants who do jobs that locals 
might want — is characteristic of both the west [35—37] and Russia [32]. The 
COVID-19 situation is different: the EU, Russia, and Kazakhstan are liberalising 
their migration policy [10—11]. Attempts to substitute Russians for migrant work-
ers were not successful either in 2008—2010 or in 2014—2016, nor are they now.
Some researchers believe that the COVID-19 crisis has hit the non-manufac-
turing industries harder [38] than other sectors. Employment risks are maximal for 
the affected service industries: 10m people have lost their jobs [39]. Yet mobility 
restrictions have provoked a supply-side crisis in the labour market, whereas earli-
er crises led to a decline in demand for labour [39]. This crisis has brought about a 
serious labour shortage in the Russian labour market. The development of platform 
economies has dampened unemployment through the labour market covidisation 
[40; 41]. This also holds true for Russia. Migrants newly engaged in the sector are 
replacing pensioners and students, who have traditionally worked in the field [42].
The new situation necessitates a study of new aspects of migration. Special 
attention should be paid to how migrants are surviving the pandemic and how 
they re-integrate once having returned home. An important line of investigation 
is exploring approaches to cooperation between governments, NGOs, and affect-
ed migrants. Furthermore, there is a need to find ways to simplify both the stay 
in the host country and the return home. This article will analyse these issues as 
observed in the CIS.
Restrictions on mobility in the CIS
The post-Soviet region has enjoyed a visa-free regime for many years. Mi-
grants move almost freely between the CIS countries, Ukraine, and Georgia (to 
some extent). Most labour migrants come to another CIS country to take ad-
vantage of simplified employment opportunities. The two leading host countries 
in the CIS are Russia and Kazakhstan. Beyond the region, most migrants seek 
employment in the EU [3]. Therefore, restrictions imposed by one country affect 
migration from or through other CIS countries.
Former Soviet republics trod on the path of restrictions as early as February 
2020 (Georgia was the first). In late March, borders between all CIS countries, 
except for Belarus, were closed for both entry and exit. A state of emergency was 
declared in many of them (see Table 1).
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Table 1
Open/closed borders of CIS countries  





Date of partial 
opening
Official situation as 
of the time  
of closure
Actual entry/exist  
situation as  
of 1 October 2020






flights or return 
home on their own.
The border is partly 
closed. Leaving the 
country is possible via 
the Belarusian border 
if one has third-coun-
try citizenship or a 
residence permit. 
Foreign citizens and 
residence permit 
holders can leave the 




Never closed The land air borders are open; citizens of 
Belarus and other states can enter and exit 
the country. Many use Belarus as a transit 
country when travelling between Russia 
and the west.
Kazakhstan 16 March12 20 June13 The border was 
partly closed. All 
foreigners who had 
arrived in Kazakh-
stan earlier could 
leave the country as 
soon as flights were 
resumed.  
Citizens of Kazakh-
stan and holders of 
residence permits can 
enter the country by 
government-char-
tered flights. Regular 
air connections are 
suspended.
910111213
9 COVID-19. National and international travel, 2020, The Government of the Russian Federa-
tion. URL: http://government.ru/rugovclassifier/891/events/ (accessed 04.08.2020).
10 Media announce date of Russian borders’ opening, 2020, Rosbalt. URL: https://www.ros-
balt.ru/russia/2020/08/01/1856622.html (accessed 04.08.2020).
11 Lukashenko: Belarus not to close borders, 2020, Izvestia newspaper. URL: https://iz.
ru/1003527/2020-04-23/lukashenko-zaiavil-ob-otsutstvii-planov-zakryvat-granitcy-belorus-
sii (accessed 04.08.2020) (in Russ.).
12 Kazakhstan to impose border crossing restrictions, 2020, TASS. URL: https://tass.ru/mezh-
dunarodnaya-panorama/7985473 (accessed 05.08.2020) (in Russ.).




Ukraine 27 March14 29 May15 The border was 
partly closed. 
Citizens of Ukraine 
stranded abroad 
had the right to 
come home.
It is possible to enter/
leave the country over 
the land border. To 
cross the EU border 
one needs a Fit-to-
Fly certificate and 
a purpose-of-entry 
document (travel is 
allowed for work pur-
poses, taking care of 
elderly relatives, and 
medical procedures).
Moldova 17 March16 1 July17 The border was 
completely closed
Citizen of Romania 
can enter and leave 




Until 10 May20 The authorities closed the border with 
China as early as February. From 21 March, 
all international flights, including those to 
Russia and the EU, were suspended. Strin-
gent quarantine restrictions were introduced 
despite the small number of cases. The 
restrictions were partly eased on 10 May
141516171819




D % D 0 % B 8 % D 1 % 8 6 % D 1 % 8 3 - % D 0 % B 8 % D 0 % B 7 - % D 0 % B 7 % D 0 % B 0 -
%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%B8%D1%80%
D1%83%D1%81%D0%B0/a-52932797 (accessed 06.08.2020).
15 What countries have opened their borders to Ukrainians, 2020, Unian. URL: https://www.
unian.net/tourism/lifehacking/otkrytie-granic-v-mire-2020-kuda-mogut-poehat-ukraincy-spi-
sok-stran-11029211.html (accessed 06.08.2020).
16 Moldova to close border to stop coronavirus, 2020, Rossiyskaya gazeta. URL: https://rg.
ru/2020/03/15/moldaviia-zakryvaet-granicu-iz-za-koronavirusa.html (accessed 07.08.2020) 
(in Russ.).
17 Willing to go abroad? Moldova’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs informs of international 
pandemic rules. 2020, Bălți independent portal. URL: https://esp.md/sobytiya/2020/06/28/
hotite-vyehat-za-granicu-mid-moldovy-informiruet-kakie-pravila-ustanovili-raznye (ac-
cessed 05.08.2020).
18 When will Georgia open its borders to tourists? Latest updates, 2020, Turister. URL: https://
www.tourister.ru/publications/1209 (accessed 06.08.2020).
19 Ibid.
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End of Table 1
202122232425262728293031
20 Coronavirus: Armenian authorities extend state of emergency for one month, 2020, RBC. 
URL: https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/5ee3411b9a79472c2a10090d (accessed 04.08.2020).
21 When will countries open their borders: a simple chart, 2020, Sputnik Armenia. URL: 
https://ru.armeniasputnik.am/infographics/20200601/23237578/Kogda-strany-otkroyut-
granitsy-naglyadnyy-grafik.html (accessed 07.08.2020).
22 Kyrgiza closes its borders, 2020, Lenta.ru. URL: https://lenta.ru/news/2020/03/17/zakrylis/ 
(accessed 08.08.2020) (in Russ.).
23 Kazakhstan opens checkpoints with Kyrgyzstan and China, 2020, Zona. URL: https://
zonakz.net/2020/06/15/kazaxstan-otkryl-punkty-propuska-na-granicax-s-kyrgyzstanom-i-
kitaem/ (accessed 07.08.2020).
24 Azerbaijan’s borders stay open, 2020, Sputnik Azerbaijan. URL: https://az.sputniknews.
ru/azerbaijan/20200529/424064097/Azerbaydzhan-ostavil-svoi-granitsy-zakrytymi.html 
(accessed 08.08.2020).
25 Azerbaijan extends border closure, 2020, Profi Travel. URL: https://profi.travel/news/47019/
details (accessed 08.08.2020).
26 Coronavirus: Turkmenistan temporarily restricts borer crossing, 202, RIA Novosti. URL: 
https://ria.ru/20200320/1568920983.html (accessed 10.08.2020) (in Russ.).
27 Opening of Turkmenian-Iranian border postponed from 1 to 10 June, 2002, Regnum. URL: 
https://regnum.ru/news/2968811.html (accessed 09.08.2020) (in Russ.).
28 Uzbekistan closes its borders: the country goes into quarantine, 2020, Sputnik Uzbekistan. 
URL: https://uz.sputniknews.ru/society/20200315/13678328/Uzbekistan-zakryvaet-granitsy — 
strana-perekhodit-na-rezhim-karantina.html (accessed 08.08.2020).
29 Uzbekistan’s borders partly open starting from today, 2020, Revizor. URL: https://
www.rewizor.ru/special-projects/revizor-travel/novosti/s-segodnyashnego-dnya-granitsy-
uzbekistana-chastichno-otkryty/ (accessed 10.08.2020).
30 Temporary procedure for international cargo deliveries by road, 2020, The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan. URL: https://mfa.tj/ru/main/view/5920/vremennyi-
poryadok-regulirovaniya-mezhdunarodnykh-perevozok-gruzovym-avtomobilnym-
transportom (accessed 10.08.2020)
31 Tajikistan is opening its borders after the coronavirus: where to fly? 2020, Sputnik Tajikistan. 
URL: https://tj.sputniknews.ru/country/20200617/1031425974/tajikistan-vozobnovlyaet-
aviasobshchenie-tri-gosudarstva.html (accessed 09.08.2020).
Armenia 16 March21 1 August22 The border was partly 
closed. All Armenian 
citizens and members of 
their families holding a 
residence permit were al-
lowed to enter the country. 
Foreign nationals and 
holders of residence 
permits could leave 
Armenia without any 
difficulty. 
Kyrgyzstan 17 March23 15 June24 The border was complete-
ly closed
The border was partly 
closed. Citizens of Russia 
and Kyrgyzstan could en-
ter the country. Transit via 
Kazakhstan was allowed.
Azerbaijan 5 April25 1 August26 The border was completely closed
Turkmenistan 20 March27 10 June28 The border was completely closed
Uzbekistan 16 March29 15 June30 The border was completely closed
Tajikistan 10 April31 1 July32 The border was completely closed
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Kazakhstan declared a national state of emergency and imposed a curfew.32 
Ukraine33 also declared a state of emergency, for one month at first and extended 
it later. Moldova imposed quarantine restrictions for 60 days.34 Kyrgyzstan and 
Georgia declared a state of emergency in some regions and cities.35 Armenia and 
Azerbaijan introduced special quarantine restrictions.36 In Uzbekistan, quarantine 
restrictions varied in severity from region to region. In Russia, a hybrid regime 
was in effect, which would change its name over the two months. The first week 
of restrictions was called ‘non-working week; the second period, ‘self-isolation’ 
and ‘regional high alert state’ (the decision to declare it was made by regional 
authorities); at the beginning of May, the name changed to ‘restrictions regime’. 
Yet the measures taken in Moscow and St Petersburg, which seriously limited the 
basic freedoms of citizens (the stay home order, the national and international 
travel ban) were de facto a state of emergency. The government of Tajikistan 
closed the borders but denied that there were any coronavirus cases in the coun-
try; no measures were taken until 30 April.37 Turkmenistan closed its border while 
denying the epidemic. The country was even going to hold a national football 
championship. The actual state of affairs in the country is unknown.38 Belarus did 
not impose any restrictions, nor were there any entry/exit or international travel 
limitations. Passengers travelled in, through, and from the country in the pre-pan-
demic regime. Belarus became the main transit corridor to the EU for people 
from neighbouring CIS countries (Russia and Ukraine).39
Across the post-Soviet space, with the exception of Belarus, migration be-
tween (and sometimes within) countries was frozen. The government urged peo-
32 Quarantine in Kazakhstan to last until end of June, 2020, Zakon.kz. URL: https://www.
zakon.kz/5021739-karantinnye-mery-v-kazahstane.html?utm_source=web&amp; utm_
medium=newsv1&amp; utm_campaign=notification (accessed 18.07.2020).
33 Coronavirus: Ukraine declared state of emergency for 30 day from 28 Match to 24 April, 
2020, DW. URL: https://www.dw.com/ru/в-украине-из-за-коронавируса-введен-режим- 
чрезвычайного-положения/a-52914514 (accessed 19.07.2020); Ukraine closes its border 
to foreign visitors from 17 March, 2020, BBC. URL: https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-
51876682 (accessed 19.07.2020).
34 Coronavirus: Moldova closes its border, 2020, Ukrainian national news, 15 March 2020. 
URL: https://www.unn.com.ua/ru/news/1857908-moldova-zakrivaye-kordon-cherez- (accessed 
20.07.2020).
35 Quarantine rules in Georgia, 2020, Kavkazsky uzel, 25 May 2020. URL: https://www.
kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/348370/ (accessed 21.07.2020).
36 Quarantine rules in Armennia, 2020, Kavkazsky uzel, 15 May 2020. URL: https://www.
kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/348360/ (accessed 21.07.2020); Coronavirus: Azerbaijan announces 
special quarantine, 2002, Izvestiya, 23.03.2020. URL: https://iz.ru/990476/2020—03—23/v-
azerbaidzhane-obiavlen-spetcialnyi-karantin-iz-za-koronavirusa (accessed 23.07.2020).
37 Tajikistan closes its border to foreign visitors due to coronavirus, 2020, Lenta.ru, 10.04.2020. 
URL: https://lenta.ru/news/2020/04/10/tadjikistan/ (accessed 25.07.2020).
38 Ibid.
39 Coronavirus cases in Belarus hit record high, 2020, Lenta.ru, 25.04.2020. URL: https://
lenta.ru/news/2020/04/25/belovirus/ (accessed 25.07.2020).
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ple to literally stay home and to observe social distancing. Society was plunged 
into isolation. Only after 11 May 2020, countries of the post-Soviet region started 
to ease domestic quarantine restrictions; border opening was discussed as well. 
On 16 March 2020, the European Commission also advised third-country na-
tionals to refrain for 30 days from non-essential travel to the EU. Member states 
followed this recommendation.
Uncoordinated border closure and suspension of international passenger trav-
el, especially that between the EU and countries that have a visa-free regime 
with the union (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia) and between Russia, Kazakhstan, 
the countries of the Eurasian Union, and Central Asia, created a situation when 
hundreds of migrants heading home were stranded at airports and borders of 
host countries. Border checkpoints could not handle the large influx of people. 
Ukraine closed half checkpoints on its border with the EU. Tajikistan, Uzbeki-
stan, and Turkmenistan simply closed the borders. The governments of all the 
countries tried to charter flights but could not cope with the huge number of those 
willing to return home.
Still, the official declaration of border closures often had little to do with the 
actual situation at checkpoints. This led to unrest at the borders of some CIS 
states. Many citizens and migrants had no access to verified information on how 
to cross the border because, officially, it remained closed.
As reported by the Institute for Demographic Research of the FCTAS RAS, 
about 32% of migrant respondents tried to return home but could not [4]. Not 
everyone was able to cross the border by car, bus, or a chartered flight.
The dearth of reliable information fuelled rumours about government-char-
tered flights and trains and makeshift camps at borders. Most speculations con-
cerned the situation at the border between Russia and Kazakhstan. For example, 
in Orenburg, 157 citizens of Kyrgyzstan spent three days at the border. On 30 
March 2020, 300 citizens of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, who could not fly out 
from Novosibirsk started a hunger strike; they had poor access to food, sanita-
tion facilities, and medical care.40 In Dagestan, more than 700 Azerbaijanis were 
stranded at the closed border with Azerbaijan. This contributed a lot to the uneasy 
coronavirus situation in the republic.41
Almost three thousand citizens of Uzbekistan spent several weeks till the mid 
of September in a camp near Rostov-on-Don. In squalid conditions, unable to 
cook food, they were waiting for the train, which carried about 1,000 people only 
in September. The next trained was scheduled for the end of October.42 At Ka-
40 Citizens of Kyrgyzstan stranded at Novosibirsk airport due to coronavirus start hunger strike, 
2020, Meduza. URL: https://meduza.io/news/2020/03/30/grazhdane-kirgizii-na-dve-nedeli-
zastryavshie-v-aeroportu-novosibirska-iz-za-koronavirusa-ob-yavili-golodovku (accessed 
25.07.2020).
41 Putin intervenes over Azerbaijani stranded at border in Dagestan, 2020, Kavkazski uzel. 
URL: https://amp.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/349772/ (accessed 27.07.2020).
42 Thousands of migrants waiting for train at makeshift camp near Rostov-on-Don, 2020, BBC 
News. URL: https://www.bbc.com/russian/topics/cxlx9qe9mn5t (accessed 29.07.2020).
21S. V. Ryazantsev, I. N. Molodikova, A. D. Bragin
zakhstan’s border with the Samara and Orenburg regions, citizens of Kyrgyzstan 
and Uzbekistan were waiting for a chance to leave at two makeshift camps for a 
month. More than 600 Tajiks were stranded at the border between Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan because of quarantine restrictions.43 Finally, the IOM provided buses 
to bring them home.44 Those who managed to return to Central Asia were placed 
in quarantine camp where they had to stay in deplorable conditions. In Uzbeki-
stan, this provoked a riot at the O’rtasaroy 20,000-bed shipping container camp 
near Tashkent. The outrage was caused by the extension of quarantine from 14 to 
30 days for some of its involuntary residents. People lived in fours in a room, and 
if one of them had the virus, longer quarantine duration applied to all the four.45 
The medical staff did not explain why isolation was organised that way.
Most Central Asian migrants stayed in host countries: 170,000 labour migrants 
remained in Kazakhstan. Only 73,000 migrants out of more than 1m working in 
Russia returned to Uzbekistan. Out of 600,000 Moldovan labour migrants in the 
EU and Russia, over 300,000 returned home.46 Ukraine welcomed back 650,000 
out of its 4—5m citizens working abroad.47 Therefore, most migrants either could 
not return home or decided to wait out the pandemic in the host country.
Migration in the CIS is short-term by nature in most cases. Thus, travel re-
strictions were very traumatic for many migrants who left behind their families 
and households. The CIS migration follows a seasonal pattern: migrants have to 
obtain permits, which makes a longer stay in the host country impossible.
To investigate the situation of migrants in the CIS, the timeline of border 
closures and openings was studied for each country. Since the actual situation 
differed from official declarations, empirical materials were collected from the 
media; employees of the CIS countries’ embassies and consulates in the Russian 
Federation were interviewed.
For half the states, the official data matched the actual state of affairs. Seven 
countries out of 12 placed a total ban on transboundary travel. Many migrants did 
not have an opportunity to either leave the host country or return home because 
air and railway connections had been suspended. The only country to leave its 
borders open was Belarus. Thus, migrants in CIS countries were faced with a 
43 Tajiki migrants stranded between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, 2020, Sputnik Tajikistan. 
URL: https://tj.sputniknews.ru/migration/20200316/1030885717/grajdane-tajikistan-zastryali- 
kazakhsta-uzbekistan.html (accessed 29.07.2020).
44 Three thousand dollars for infected foreign nationals, bogus call-outs, and akims in 
quarantine: chronicles of Central Asian response to coronavirus, 2020, Fergana news. URL: 
https://fergana.site/articles/119393/ (accessed 29.07.2020).
45 Uzbeks riot at quarantine camp, demand they be sent home, 2020, Mediazona. URL: https://
mediazona.ca/news/2020/07/10/quarantine-riot (accessed 30.07.2020).
46 Coronavirus delivers blow to Moldova’s economy, 2020, Deutsche Welle. URL: https://
www.dw.com/ru/коронавирус-нанес-мощный-удар-по-молдавской-экономике-23042020/
av-53226376 (accessed 30.07.2020).
47 Ukraine to close its border to foreign visitors from 17 March, 2020, BBC. URL: https://
www.bbc.com/russian/news-51876682 (accessed 30.07.2020).
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choice between staying in a foreign country and waiting for the restrictions to 
be lifted or trying to return home, often via third countries, without a chance of 
coming back until the pandemic is over.
The only available mode of international travel (if border crossing was al-
lowed) was land transport. Citizens of some states were allowed to leave the 
country in case of emergency — to visit the funeral of a close relative or to re-
ceive urgent medical care abroad. In some cases to enter a western country, visi-
tors in transit through Belarus had to have a Fit-to-Fly certificate.
Migration policies of the CIS countries in the COVID-19 pandemic
To major host countries, Russia and Kazakhstan (they account for 90% of the 
CIS labour migrants) had to respond to the involuntary violation of the law by 
migrants when they overstay or were not able to get licence to work. That was in-
evitable since all immigration authorities no longer worked with applicants, and 
borders had been closed [4]. Russia and Kazakhstan liberalised their migration 
laws as regards the stay in the country and access to the labour market of foreign 
citizens during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Kazakhstan took specific measures to ease the situation of migrants amid iso-
lation and border closure. A distinct feature of Kazakhstan’s labour market is that 
private farmers and small businesses in border areas employ domestic workers 
form Uzbekistan. The issue of legal stay of migrants was widely discussed in the 
country before the pandemic. Kazakhstan’s domestic labour market is mostly un-
documented; only 13% of the workers have written contracts of employment [4].
On 22 March 2020, the National State of Emergency Commission under the 
President of Kazakhstan decided to extend visas and working permits for foreign 
citizens to 20 April 2020 and to prolong the length of stay for those who had ar-
rived in Kazakhstan under visa-free agreements, which the state had concluded 
with 57 countries. Administrative penalties for overstaying were cancelled.48
The Russian Federation also tried to minimise risks of illegality for migrants 
in the pandemic. Presidential decree No. 274 of 18 April 202049 automatically 
extended the duration oflabour licences, working permits, visas, residence per-
mits, and registrations expiring from 15 March to 15 June 2020. During those 
months, migrants did not have to apply for the extension of any documents. The 
no-entry deportation and expulsion periods were suspended as well. Employers 
had the right to use migrant labour. An important novelty was the amendment to 
48 Kazakhstan to extend visa and working permits for foreign nationals to 20 April, 2020, 
Forbes Kazakhstan. URL: https://forbes.kz/news/2020/03/22/newsid_221696 (accessed 
01.08.2020).
49 On temporary measures to regulate the legal statues of foreign nationals and stateless persons 
in the Russian Federation amid the spread of the novel coronavirus infection (COVID-19): 
Presidential decree of 18.04.2020 No. 274 (revised on 23.09.2020), 2020. URL: https://www.
consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_350638/ (accessed 17.09.2020).
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law 135-FZ On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens, which lifted the restriction 
on extending labour licenseduration without exiting Russia.50 Foreign nationals 
can extend their licenseswhile staying in Russia as long as they have to. The State 
Duma adopted amendments to federal law 109-FZ On Registration of Foreign 
Nationals and Stateless Persons in the Russian Federation of 18 July 2006.51 On 
7 September 2020, migrant registration procedures were further liberalised until 
15 December 2020.52
On 16 September 2020, the Prime Minister of Russia, Mikhail Mishustin, an-
nounced the forthcoming simplification of obtaining ordinary private visas, as 
well as long-stay visas for close relatives of Russian nationals having different 
citizenship. This group of foreign nationals will be able to obtain a long-stay 
Russian visa based on a simple written application from a Russian citizen, and 
they no longer will have to leave the country every three months.53 Similarly to 
most EU member states, the two major host countries of the CIS, Russia and Ka-
zakhstan, liberalised the stay in the country and access to their labour markets for 
most migrants residing in the two states, regardless of the previous (documented 
or undocumented) status of such person. In effects, this meant amnesty for un-
documented migrants.
The lockdown: the transformation  
of the CIS economies and labour markets
The COVID-19 pandemic caused a dramatic transformation in the labour 
market of the CIS countries. All the states had to impose transport and travel 
restrictions. They also shut down businesses in catering, services, construction, 
and commerce, i. e. the industries that traditionally employ labour migrants. The 
restrictions had a severe effect on the financial situation of those numerous mi-
grants who had worked unofficially and could not expect redundancy pay. Most 
migrants lost their jobs without notice; some of them were denied their due wag-
es. Early in July 2020, the situation in CIS labour markets was grim.
50 On amendments to article 133 of federal law On the Legal Status of Foreign Nationals 
in the Russian Federation: federal law of 24.04.2020 No. 135-FZ, 2020. URL: https://www.
consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_351148/ (accessed 17.09.2020).
51 On amendments to federal law On Registration of Foreign Nationals and Stateless Persons 
in the Russian Federation — federal law of 08.06.2020 No. 182-FZ, 2020. URL: https://www.
consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_354481/ (accessed 17.09.2020).
52 Migrants can register online using the Russian government services portal; the complicated 
procedure of cancelling registration at one address to obtain registration at a different one was 
abrogated; according to the new law, all migrants can register themselves and other migrants 
to the address of the property they own.
53 Mishustin announces visa regime simplification for relatives from abroad, 2020, Novaya 
gazeta, 16.09.2020, availablr at: https://novayagazeta.ru/news/2020/09/16/164306-mishustin-
anonsiroval-uproschenie-vizovogo-rezhima-dlya-inostrannyh-rodstvennikov-rossiyan 
(accessed 17.09.2020).
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In Russia, about 54% of working migrants have lost their jobs. Once made 
redundant, even those who had an official job can no longer pay for accommoda-
tion, extend their patents and other documents, or send remittances back home. 
Overall, 32% of migrant have lost their sources of income [4].
Migrants working officially are entitled to sick pays from their employers. 
The failure of an employer to do so and discharging an employee instead is a 
violation of the Labour Code — the laid-off person has the right to go to court.54 
Those working unofficially found themselves in a difficult situation. Not protect-
ed by the Labour Code, they have serious difficulty with defending their rights 
to sick or redundancy pays. This group of migrants has become one of the most 
vulnerable in the pandemic.55 The number of undocumented migrants in Russia 
is estimated at 2.5—3.4m people, most of them working in Moscow and St Pe-
tersburg and their environs [4]. Thus, the number of unemployed migrants could 
reach 1m as the pandemic struck.
As President Vladimir Putin stressed in his address of 11 May 2020, the epi-
demic left 1.4m Russians jobless.56 The press office of Russia’s Ministry of La-
bour spoke of 2.8m unemployed as early as June 2020. A survey conducted by 
the Levada Centre57 in April 2020 shows that almost a third of Russian citizens 
from families with at least one employee was affected by pay cuts (33%), a fourth 
encountered salary delays (25%), and a fifth, lay-offs (26%). According to the 
survey, as early as August 2019, 64% of respondents (all of them Russian citi-
zens), agreed that ‘my relatives and acquaintances are ready to take jobs that are 
now done by migrants’. Another 44% believed that ‘most migrants live better and 
have more money than my family and I do’. A deteriorating financial situation 
and bleak employment prospects of the local population may cause the idea of 
employment competition from migrants to fuel anti-migrant sentiment and social 
tension.58 A possible growth in unemployment in Russia will further exacerbate 
the situation of CIS migrants residing in the country. Many of them will have to 
return home if this becomes possible.
In Kazakhstan, after a state of emergency had been declared, about 2m peo-
ple lost their jobs. Over 12,000 entrepreneurs applied for government support, 
54 ‘Our savings will last a week: how migrants staying in Moscow are surviving self-
isolation and quarantine, 2020, Fergana. URL: https://fergana.site/articles/116812/ (accessed 
17.09.2020).
55 Doctors ask for insurance and registration. Who will help migrants wick with coronavirus and 
their roommates? 2020, Fergana. URL: https://fergana.agency/articles/117247/?country=kz 
(accessed 15.09.2020).
56 Putin addressing the nation, 2020, Youtube. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
owpG4fneHDM (accessed 10.09.2020).
57 The employment rate, 2020, Levada Centre. URL: https://www.levada.ru/2020/05/19/
ZANYATOST-NASELENIYA/ (accessed 14.08.2020).
58 Form isolation to migration, 2020, Levada Centre. URL: https://www.levada.ru/2020/06/04/
OT-IZOLYATSII-K-MIGRATSII/ (accessed 19.07.2020).
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80% of the representatives of small and medium businesses, services, and com-
merce. These two groups account for approximately half the country’s working 
population.59
The government of Tajikistan closed the country’s borders preventing hun-
dreds of thousands of Tajik migrants from coming to Russia for seasonal work. 
The state was left without foreign currency since labour migration provides 80% 
of foreign currency inflow.60
In Uzbekistan, the spread of the COVID-19 virus has paralysed almost all in-
dustries of the economy. A survey conducted by the country’s Central Bank says 
that 56% of respondents experienced a decline in household incomes, whereas 
15% were left without any income whatsoever.61
Kyrgyzstan’s economy fell sharply. The closure of the border stopped the flow 
of customers from Kazakhstan who account for a substantial proportion of sales 
in the country. Most of the country’s population works for small and medium 
businesses. Kyrgyzstan had to appeal to international donors. The IMF has al-
ready pledged USD 120.9m to support the state.62
In Ukraine, the closure of borders has frozen traditional short-term circular mi-
gration to the EU and Russia. Ukrainians constitute a significant part of Poland’s 
agricultural workforces (in 2018, 99% of all seasonal work permits were issued to 
Ukrainian nationals). About 12% of Ukrainian labour migrants whose permissions 
to take a job in Poland were expiring and who did not have a job at the time left the 
country before 1 April 2020 because of COVID-19 restrictions. Ukrainians resid-
ing in the Czech Republic and Italy, countries that do not share a common border 
with Ukraine, had serious difficulty in returning home. They had to cross several 
countries that had closed their border to foreign visitors. Ukrainian migrants are 
using transit corridors running through Belarus, Austria, Hungary, and Romania. 
Besides, they currently do not have a chance of coming back.
The lockdown created high shortage of agricultural workers in the western 
countries. The attempts of Germany, Austria, the UK, and Finland to bring in 
seasonal workers aboard chartered flights operated by a private Estonian airline 
succeeded only once. On 23 April 2020, the MAU airline made a flight carry-
ing 200 Ukrainians to Finnish farms, although Finland was ready to welcome 
14,000 Ukrainians for seasonal works. The government of Ukraine suspended 
59 The coronacrisis in Central Asia: the economic consequences of the pandemic in Central Asia, 
2020, Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting. URL: https://cabar.asia/ru/koronakrizis-
v-tsentralnoj-azii-ekonomicheskie-posledstviya-pandemii/ (accessed 28.08.2020).
60 Ibid.
61 Uzbek families buy less meet in the pandemic, 2020, Sputnik Uzbekistan. URL: https://
uz.sputniknews.ru/society/20200820/14809956/Koronavirus-v-Uzbekistane-glavnoe-na-20-
avgusta.html (accessed 05.09.2020).
62 UNDP COVID-19 in the Kyrgyz Republic: Evaluating socioeconomic-effects, vulnerability, 
and policy responses, 2020, United Nations in Kyrgyz Republic, August 2020. URL: https://
kyrgyzstan.un.org/sites/default/files/2020—08/UNDP-ADB%2520SEIA_11%2520August%
25202020%2520Rus.pdf (accessed 05.10.2020).
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those flights, as stated by the Estonian ambassador to Ukraine, Kaimo Kuuusk.63 
Labour migrants became a matter for negotiation between the Ukrainian and EU 
authorities. The Ukrainian Prime Minister, Denis Shmygal, informed the EU am-
bassador to Ukraine, Matti Maasikas, that the country’s government was ready to 
negotiate with European state willing to offer Ukrainians official seasonal jobs.64 
Based on the crisis scenario of coronavirus spread, Ukraine’s Cabinet predicted 
in June that fewer than 50% of migrants would return their jobs abroad, and the 
unemployment rate would go up.65
Migrants under lockdown: hardships of survival
In April 2020, the authors of this article worked on a random-sample survey 
carried out at the Institute for Demographic Research. Respondents were labour 
migrants of age 18 and over (717 people) recruited via social media (Facebook 
and VKontakte) and migrant organisations [13].66 About 84% of respondents 
mentioned a loss or reduction in income; over half (65%) either lost their jobs 
(28%) or were furloughed (37%). Half the respondents (51%) were able to send 
remittances back home in April. The most serious problems encountered by mi-
grants were the inability to pay for accommodation (64%), the lack of jobs (45%), 
not having enough money to buy food (43%), troubles with the police (20%), 
deplorable living conditions (11%), and not having enough money to pay for the 
patent (lisence) (2%). About 1% of respondents said that they had tested positive 
for the coronavirus, and 3%, that their relatives and/or friends were sick with the 
infection [4].
Moreover, 32% of labour migrants who had arrived in Russia failed to ob-
tain necessary permits (as calculated by the To Be Precise [Esli Byt’ Tochnym] 
project).67 The Russian media discussed that, due to the pandemic, most labour 
migrants might switch to unofficial employment, and this would lead to wage 
dumping and increase xenophobia.
The number of calls to the hotline of the Tong Jahoni human rights organisa-
tion increased to 14,200 in March-April 2020, which is twice that in March-April 
63 Ukraine is Africa of many centuries ago, 2020, News-Front INFO. URL: https://news-front.
info/2020/05/03/ukraina-cze-afrika-prichem-mnogovekovoj-davnosti/ (accessed 11.07.2020).
64 EU countries welcome Ukrainians foe work: Cabinet creates workgroup, 2020, Inforesist. 
URL: https://inforesist.org/strany-es-massovo-priglashayut-ukrainczev-na-rabotu-v-kabmine- 
sozdali-rabochuyu-gruppu/ (accessed 13.09.2020).
65 Cabinet to consider two post-pandemic scenarios for economy, 2020, NV. URL: https://
nv.ua/biz/economics/koronavirus-v-ukraine-kakie-posledstviya-dlya-ekonomiki-novosti-
ukrainy-50094584.html (accessed 07.09.2020).
66 Ryazantsev, S. V. 2020, The Situation of Migrant Workers in Russia During the COVID-19 
Pandemic (Results of a Sociological Study), International Conference The Impact of the 
COVID-19 Pandemic on Migration Mobility, Institute of Socio-Political Research of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences and MGIMO University, 27 April 2020, Moscow. URL: http://
испи.рф/the-impact-of-the-covid-19-pandemic-on-migration-mobility/ (accessed 14.07.2020).
67 From isolation to migration, 2020, Levada Centre. URL: https://www.levada.ru/2020/06/04/
OT-IZOLYATSII-K-MIGRATSII/ (accessed 10.08.2020).
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2019 (5,500 calls). The key reasons why people contacted Tong Jahoni remained 
the same: arbitrary detention (up twofold, from 2.2 to 4.1 reported cases); seeking a 
legal consultation (up by 30%, from 2,100 to 2,700); solicitation of bribes by the po-
lice (up threefold, from 600 to 1,300); requests for humanitarian aid (nine in March-
April 2019 and 1292 in the same months 2020; the fourth most popular reason).68
Trying to cut their expenses, most migrants are choosing the cheapest hostels 
that are not fit for isolation — each fourth migrant shares a room with four to 
eight other people (27%) [4]. Such living conditions make social distancing al-
most impossible and leave migrants exposed to the risk of infection.
The official policy on isolating infected migrants at hostels and the ban on go-
ing out even to buy groceries add to pandemic-induced problems. For instance, in 
a hostel in the village of Novosergievka in the Leningrad region, the police locked 
in 485 migrants, of which 123 were tested positive for COVID-19. As reported by 
Tong Jahoni NGO, over 30 migrant hostels in Moscow, each having hundreds of 
beds, have been quarantined. Human rights activists believe that the virus spreads 
not because of situation in hostels but because of the owners of the hostels and 
sometimes migrants themselves throwing the infected migrants out of hostels.69
The language barrier to communication with physicians is yet another prob-
lem. Doctors are helping migrants to recover from the coronavirus: they give 
away free medicine and admit migrants to the hospital when needed. Still, many 
migrants do not speak Russian well and cannot articulate clearlythe ambulance 
crew how they feel, and there are cases when migrants have been denied emer-
gency help and hospitalisation.70
The restrictions imposed in Russia have created administrative some situa-
tions that turned many law-abiding migrants into undocumented:
1) Russian migration services work was suspended from the end of March; it 
became impossible to extend the duration of a labour licenses, a residence permit, 
or any other document necessary for a migrant to legally stayin the country;
2) many migrants were not paid for the work they had already performed; nor 
did they receive any furlough payment when put in quarantine, although President 
Vladimir Putin demanded to do that in his address to the business community;71
68 Chupik, V. 2020, The problems of migrants in Russia durung self-isolation, International 
conference The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Migration Mobility, Institute of Socio-
Political Research of the Russian Academy of Sciences and MGIMO University, 27 April 
2020, Moscow. URL: http://испи.рф/the-impact-of-the-covid-19-pandemic-on-migration-
mobility/ (accessed 10.08.2020).
69 ‘They threw me out when I got sick’. Hostels with COVID-19 cases are being closed, 
residents are left locked in, 2020, Fergana. URL: https://fergana.site/articles/117910/ 
(accessed 09.07.2020).
70 Doctors ask for insurance and registration, 2020, Fergana. URL: https://fergana.ru/
articles/117247/ (accessed 02.08.2020).
71 ‘I’d rather they pay wages than give me a bowl of soup’. How can large businesses and 
diaspora help stranded migrants? 2020, Fergana. URL: https://fergana.plus/articles/117911/ 
(accessed 28.08.2020).
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3) amendments were made to the Code of Administrative Offences concern-
ing violations of quarantine restrictions. This led to a growing number of de-
tentions of migrants by the police both in the streets and at places of residence. 
More detentions meant mass arrests, deportations, and placing migrants awaiting 
expulsion in special detention centres.
A lawyer from the Civic Assistance Committee NGO, Anna Gorodetskaya, 
calls these amendments, alongside fines levied on violators, illicit measures taken 
by the Russian authorities: ‘Such measures are possible only in a state of emer-
gency, which has not been declared’. Another lawyer, Tong Jahoni’s Valentina 
Chupik adds more detail: ‘If a state of emergency had been declared in Russia, 
the state would pay for food, accommodation, and the time out of employment’.72 
In reality, migrants had to bear all the expenses themselves.
The economic fallout of the lockdown in the source countries:  
the declining number of remittances
The economic consequences of the pandemic cannot yet be fully evaluated. 
The restrictions imposed in Russia during the first wave of COVID19 caused the 
country’s GDP to fall by 12%.73 Ukraine’s Cabinet expects investment and con-
sumption to plummet, which will prevent the country from returning to pre-pan-
demic levels, whereas government deficit will continue to grow.74 Data from the 
Statistical Committee of the CIS demonstrate that the economic performance of 
the second six months of 2020 was below that of the first six months of 2019 in 
constant prices: GDP decreased on average by 3—6%; investment, from 23% in 
Armenia to 2.7% in Belarus; retail, by 1.5—19%. In all CIS countries, consumer 
prices have risen.
The most substantial decline was that in passenger traffic, both internal and 
external. It dwindled by more than a third (to 64%). The passenger traffic figures 
and the number of passengers paint a vivid picture of how closed internation-
al borders and travel restrictions have affected migration flows. Table 2 shows 
quantitative data on the volume and dynamics of passenger traffic in the first half 
of 2020 compared to previous years. Investment is used as the primary indicator 
of national socio-economic development. A decrease in passenger traffic affects 
capital investment in the country and thus the economy as a whole.
72 They threw me out when I got sick’. Hostels with COVID-19 cases are being closed, 
residents are left locked in, 2020, Fergana. URL: https://fergana.site/articles/117910/ 
(accessed 28.08.2020).
73 Putin named growing unemployment the greatest global problem, 2020, RIA. URL: https://
ria.ru/20200623/1573378512.html (accessed 09.09.2020).





Passenger traffic and capital investment in the CIS 
Country










































































































































































Azerbaijan 602.0 73.7 101.9 9.5 70.4 99.0 97.3
Armenia 34.9 44.4 104.5 0.5 45.4 102.5 76.6
Belarus 541.6 85.3 99.97 7.5 70.0 106.1 98.6
Kazakhstan 4 737.7 54.5 101.3 54.4 52.7 98.7 97.1
Kyrgyzstan 156.3 50.2 101.1 2.6 50.2 99.9 85.2
Moldova 23.0 53.3 103.4 1.1 49.3 105.7 85.1
Russia 3 909.0 67.8 97.9 141.3 54.4 108.1 96.0
Tajikistan 290.2 90.8 111.8 3.5 79.8 101.9 95.4
Uzbekistan 1 348.2 103.2 102.2 30.8 100.6 103.7 87.2
Ukraine 547.9 55.2 94.9 18.6 41.9 105.7 65.1
CIS total 12 190.7 64.3 100.1 269.8 56.8 104.9 94.0
Source: Statistical Committee of the CIS. URL: http://www.cisstat.org.
Passenger traffic has substantially decreased since the outbreak of COVID-19, 
compared to previous years. Only Uzbekistan has improved its performance. On 
average the industry has fallen by 45—55% (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Ukraine), which is a critical level. As to capital investment, no CIS 
country has reached the 2019 figures. This means that the restrictions have taken 
their toll on almost all industries that are connected, directly or indirectly, to mi-
grant labour.
The situation in the labour market was very difficult for migrants themselves. 
The survey showed that migrants employed in services and construction were 
deprived of both means of subsistence and the chance to find a new job amid 
COVID-19 restrictions. The number of remittances that migrants send back to 
families has decreased as a result.75 During peak restrictions, the number of re-
mittances from Russia declined by over 50%. Migrants themselves were badly 
in need of money and could not count on wages.76 A downward income trend has 
emerged in both source and host countries.
75 Migrants from Central Asia living below the breadline need help, 2020, UN. URL: https://
news.un.org/ru/story/2020/05/1378202 (accessed 14.07.2020).
76 COVID-19 pandemic: what will happen to migrants’ incomes in Russia, 2020, Sputnik 
Uzbekistan. URL: https://uz.sputniknews.ru/infographics/20200413/13914566/Pandemiya- 
COVID-19-chto-budet-s-dokhodami-migrantov-v-Rossii.html (accessed 15.07.2020).
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A sharp decrease in remittances pose an enormous challenge to source coun-
tries, such as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, whose citizens are em-
ployed primarily in Russia and Kazakhstan [7]. The economies of Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan will bear the brunt: since 2010, remittances have steadily been over 
25% of the countries’ GDP, constituting a substantial component of their econo-
mies.77 The negative economic background may contribute to greater social ten-
sions and political instability in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. They 
can also cause unrest among migrants residing abroad. In Kyrgyzstan, this pro-
cess started after the parliamentary election. Protesters stormed the building of 
the parliament, mass rallies followed, and a curfew was imposed on 12 October 
2020 because of the unstable situation, threats to the lives, health, and security 
of citizens, and the need to restore public order.78 A similar picture of political 
instability is observed in Belarus where protests have continued since the August 
presidential election.79 The economic crisis has contributed to the political crisis 
in Azerbaijan and Armenia where battles over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh 
region resumed resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. If these conflicts con-
tinue, Russia may become the destination for a large number of refugees.
The World Bank expects remittances to post-Soviet republics to fall by 28% 
amid the pandemic due to the economic crisis and isolation. This will deprive 
many vulnerable households of financial support. In 2019, about 76% of mi-
grants registered in Russia for the first time came from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine. The total amount of remittances sent from Russia to 
CIS countries reached USD 12.9bn.80 Dependence on remittances is very heavy 
at a regional and local level. In the Kyrgyz city of Osh, over 30% of house-
holds live on remittances.81 In February-April 2020, this proportion decreased 
by 20—30%.82
77 World Development Indicators (WDI). Global Financial Development, 2020, The World 
Bank. URL: https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/remittance-inflows-gdp] (accessed 15.07.2020).
78 Borisenko, L. 2020, Head of Kyrgyzstan reintroduces state of emergency in Bishkek, 2020, 
Rossiyskaya gazeta, 12.10.2020. URL: https://rg.ru/2020/10/12/glava-kirgizii-povtorno-vvel-
rezhim-chrezvychajnogo-polozheniia-v-bishkeke.htmlм (accessed 14.10.2020).
79 The first day of ‘national strike’ in Belarus, 2020, RBC. URL: https://www.rbc.ru/photorepo
rt/26/10/2020/5f96ac279a79472f06268cd1 (accessed 30.10.2020).
80 Form isolation to migration, 2020, Levada Centre. URL: https://www.levada.ru/2020/06/04/
OT-IZOLYATSII-K-MIGRATSII/ (accessed 08.07.2020).
81 Ergeshbaev, U. 2020, The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on labour migration and the 
socio-economic situation in Kyrgyzstan, International conference The Impact of the COVID-19 
Pandemic on Migration Mobility, Institute of Socio-Political Research of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences and MGIMO University, 27 April 2020, Moscow. URL: http://испи.рф/
the-impact-of-the-covid-19-pandemic-on-migration-mobility/ (accessed 16.07.2020).




Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Ukraine are also running the risk of losing 
the substantial source of income that remittances are (they account for over 10% 
of the GDPs of these states).83 On top of that, residents of source countries are not 
welcome to returned compatriots-migrants — there are fears that they will carry 
disease and cause stiffer competition for jobs.
Conclusion
Since it is still unclear when the COVID-19 pandemic will end and the restric-
tions are likely to hold up, many seasonal migrants unable to return home will 
become long-term migrants.
The pandemic has affected the world economy and migration, and CIS 
countries are no exception. The lockdown policy caused many migrants to lose 
their jobs and stable incomes almost at once. What makes the situation even 
worse is that they cannot return home to wait out the hard times. The closure 
of borders limited the mobility of migrants who found themselves stranded in 
a foreign country. In a difficult situation, sometimes without means of subsis-
tence, many of them were physically locked in at hostels because of the virus 
or its threat. All this influenced adversely both source and host countries. For 
the former, the pandemic-induced crisis means the loss of a stable inflow of 
remittances, which account for significant proportions of their GDPs, and the 
return of hundreds of thousands of unemployed and probably sick citizens. 
For the latter, the negative consequences include the loss of cheap labour that 
will be difficult to recoup. An important factor is travel to both source and host 
countries becoming more expensive since any route involves multiple modes 
of transport, travel opportunities are few, and it is necessary to be tested for 
COVID-19 in both states. Migrants’ behaviour has to change — they are faced 
with the choice between long-term migration or giving up working abroad and 
looking for a new way to earn a living.
Russia and Kazakhstan have substantially liberalised their migration laws giv-
ing migrants residing on its territory a chance to maintain legal status and access 
the labour market. As the data above show, many CIS countries have not gone 
to great length to minimise the risks of the migration crisis. Having closed their 
borders, some states deprived own migrants of any chance of returning home. 
The actual state of affairs differed much from official declarations, and this fur-
ther aggravated the situation for migrants. Home countries were doing nothing 
to bring back their citizens, and host countries were not aiding foreign nationals 
in returning home; people were doing this one their own, often choosing paths of 
doubtful legality.
83 Emerging Europe braces for sharp drop in remittances from foreign workers, 2020, Emerging 
Europe. URL: https://emerging-europe.com/news/emerging-europe-braces-for-sharp-drop-in-
remittances-from-foreign-workers/] (accessed 20.08.2020).
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The lack of coordination between home and host countries resulted in that 
thousands of migrants found themselves in deplorable conditions at makeshift 
camps or airports. Russia and Kazakhstan as the main destination countries for 
the CIS labour migrants aided migrants in extending the duration of documents 
and suspended legal punishments for the overstay.
Although there are no industry-specific data, it is safe to assume that some 
industries are in a desperate state because of coronavirus restrictions, where-
as others are in need of migrant labour. Governments must help workers from 
shutdown businesses find employment with active businesses. Laid-off migrants 
must be able to apply for a work permit and stay in the country for a month or 
longer depending on the situation. All this has already been done in Italy and V4 
countries.
We believe that the CIS states have to develop a package of measures to sup-
port migrants since the COVID-19 crisis has severely affected this social group. 
These measures should be aimed to:
• simplify the extension of documents and work permits. The restrictions make 
the search for a new job a long and arduous task. Migrants must have the right to 
stay in the country legally while looking for a job, focusing on new employment 
rather than getting paperwork in order. Apps used during the lockdown to manage 
the status of migrants can relieve migration services of part of their work after the 
restrictions are lifted;
• formulate clear criteria for people eligible to cross the border. Today, po-
tential seasonal workers are experiencing problems with visa-free entry (nor can 
they obtain visas because consulates are closed);
• create multi-language portals to disseminate coordinated information on the 
situation in the CIS to quash rumour and prevent panic, which leads to the emer-
gence of makeshift camps, riots, and migrants congregating at places that are not 
fit for accommodating people;
• introduce the system of online job applications. The digitalisation of tradi-
tional procedures and formalities will help fulfil the stay-at-home and physical 
distancing requirements. It will make the procedures swifter and more efficient 
for seasonal and domestic migrant workers;
• assist migrants in returning home. Regular chartered flights must be ar-
ranged by consulates of CIS countries. Borders must always stay open for the 
country’s nationals willing to come home as well as for foreign citizens trying to 
leave the country;
• introduce social safety nets. Employers should not dismiss migrants as long 
as the restrictions are in effect since it will be very difficult to find a new job; the 
absence of income will put migrants on the edge of survival;
• provide medical care. In the current situation, many migrants were locked 
in at large hostels. This was very unsafe since the accommodation is shared by 
both infected and healthy people. Migrants with suspected COVID-19 must have 
access to medical care and safe lodging where they can self-isolate.
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In the constantly changing situation and amid restrictions, it is impossible to 
minimise effectively risks faced by migrants. Yet if no action is taken, the econ-
omy will suffer, the crime rate will rise, and social tension will pile up in both 
source and host countries. Popular discontent with the economic situation in CIS 
countries may spark off conflicts within and between countries. These conflicts 
may be provoked to divert attention from the economy. In this case, refugees 
will replace migrants, and the complicated situation in the region will be further 
aggravated.
The article was based on the research studies that were done with the financial 
support of RFBR for the project N 20-04-60479.
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